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'To conjoin . . . the names Hegel and Marx . . . is not so much to express a relationship as to raise a problem -one of the most challenging problems in the history of thought.' 1 Without doubt, this 'problem' of connecting Hegel and Marx has been recurrent within Marxist discourse from the end of the nineteenth century to the present. By delineating the main lines of the historical development of this connection this Introduction contextualises the more detailed contributions that follow. What will be discovered is that the nature of Marx's comments on Hegel's philosophy has left an ambiguous legacy. One pervasive theme, though, is the interpretation of Hegel's idealist philosophy as being shrouded in mysticism. Marx's main contribution, according to this view, was to demystify Hegel's thought through a more materialist, dialectical approach. At the same time, however, there have been those who have sought to rupture this Hegel-Marx connection and purge Hegelianism from Marxism altogether. Appropriate and expunge have therefore been the two main responses to Hegel's influence on Marxism, as we shall see. To comprehend these developments fully, we need to return to the origins of the connection with Marx's early involvement with the Young Hegelians. After elucidating Marx's own comments on Hegel's importance to Marxism, the trajectory of the connection through the main Marxist thinkers can be established. The final section illustrates recent developments of the connection, to which the current contributions are then related.
The Young Hegelians and Marx
There is an ambivalence about Marx's attitude to Hegel which is present throughout Marx's life and which can be clearly discerned in even his As is well known, many of the ideas associated with Marx's critique of Hegel's philosophy at this time were stimulated by his reading of the works of Ludwig Feuerbach. However, Marx's attitude towards Feuerbach himself at this time is not entirely uncritical. In his Theses on Feuerbach (1845), for example, Marx argues that Feuerbach's materialism was inadequate because it was too 'contemplative' or 'theoretical'. Within Feuerbach's thought, theory and practice remained distinct rather than in unity with one another.
18 According to Marx, Feuerbach failed to see that 'all mysteries which lead theory to mysticism find their rational solution in human practice and in the comprehension of this practice'. 19 Ironically, Feuerbach's materialism retained the very idealistic mysticism that he had been critical of in Hegel's philosophy, according to Marx. As is indicated by the famous eleventh of Marx's Theses on Feuerbach, this particular criticism of Feuerbach's materialism in effect amounted to a criticism of a purely 'philosophical' approach to the world in general.
Marx's Later Writings
In the Grundrisse notebooks (1857-8), Marx continued his early depiction of Hegel as being a philosophical idealist trapped within the realm of thought, and began to make a more explicit enunciation of his own materialist dialectical approach to the world. In doing so, Marx declared how a re-reading of Hegel's Logic had been of 'great use' to him in this process, and expressed his desire to write a short book on the value of Hegel's dialectic shorn of its mysticism.
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In the Grundrisse, Marx is keen to emphasise the differences between his own dialectic compared to that of Hegel. He develops his own 'dialectical' approach to the study of political economy by making a distinction between general and determinate abstractions. General abstraction refers to the abstraction from concrete social circumstances, which allows a common element amongst phenomena to be focused on. An example of this, for Marx, is production in general, which is an abstraction from the differences that arise in production in particular social periods.
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Determinate abstraction, on the other hand, is a movement from the general to the particular or concrete. For Marx the 'scientifically correct method' in the discipline of political economy is the ascent from 'simple relations, such as labour, division of labour, need, exchange value, to the level of the state, exchange between nations and the world market'.
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Hence, determinate abstraction involves understanding the concrete as a 'concentration of many determinations'. 23 The world market is thus a concentration of determinate abstractions which go all the way back to labour. Again, Marx uses Hegel as a point of contrast to indicate the incorrect method for analysing phenomena. According to Marx, Hegel 'fell into the illusion of conceiving the real as the product of thought concentrating itself, probing its own depths, and unfolding itself out of itself, by itself'. 24 Instead, Marx argues, the movement from abstract to concrete is simply the way thought duplicates the concrete, or the material world, in the mind. Hegel mistakenly thinks that this movement from abstract to concrete is the way the concrete 'comes into being'. 25 He therefore understands the 'conceptual world' as the 'only reality' and forgets that the 'real subject retains its autonomous existence' outside the realm of thought.
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Marx's preoccupation with depicting Hegel as a mystical idealist here does not alter the fact that many commentators see the Grundrisse as being heavily influenced by Hegel's philosophy. 27 For example, Hegel's discussion of the development of individuality through labour, and the shaping of the external environment, is reflected in Marx's emphasis on how a person is objectified through production. The ambivalence of Marx's attitude towards Hegel in his later writings is also readily apparent in the well-known Afterword to the second German edition of volume I of Capital (1873). Marx uses the Afterword to demarcate his own dialectic from the dialectic of Hegel. To this end, Marx emphatically declares that his 'dialectical method is, in its foundations, not only different from the Hegelian, but exactly opposite to it'.
32 Again, Marx berates Hegel for supposing that 'the process of thinking . . . is the creator of the real world, and the real world is only the external appearance of the idea'. 33 In Hegel's hands, therefore, the dialectic becomes 'mystified', which means that it 'must be inverted, in order to discover the rational kernel within the mystical shell'. 34 Ironically, however, it was Marx himself who at the time was accused of being something of an 'idealist', an accusation that had clearly worried him when writing the Grundrisse. In a review of Capital by the Russian economist I. I. Kaufmann, Marx was criticised because, although he had a thoroughly 'realistic' method of enquiry, nevertheless his method of presentation was that of a philosophical 'idealist'; in effect, it was that of a 'Hegelian'. 35 Marx responded to this criticism by arguing that the method of presentation and that of inquiry must be different. The method of inquiry 'has to appropriate the material in detail, to analyse its different forms of development and to track down their inner connection'. 36 Once this process has been accomplished, the 'real movement' can then be presented, and the 'life of the subject matter is reflected back into the ideas, as in a mirror'. 37 Marx realises that such a method of presentation could give the impression that the final result is merely an 'a priori construction' and hence philosophically 'idealist'.
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Despite all these criticisms, Marx nevertheless insists that there is still a great deal to be said for Hegelian philosophy, and especially for Hegel's commitment to 'dialectics'. In the Afterword, Marx openly avows himself a 'pupil' of Hegel, that 'mighty thinker', and reveals that he had 'coquetted with the mode of expression peculiar to him' in the chapter on value in volume I of Capital.
39 He also praises Hegel for being the 'first to present' the 'general forms of motion' of the dialectic 'in a comprehensive and conscious manner'. 40 For Marx, Hegel had made a crucial contribution to the development of a dialectical approach to the world, despite his mystical idealism. One central theme of the essay is Engels' interest in Marx's attitude towards philosophy. Indeed, Engels is especially concerned to present Marx as a philosopher. At the least, he suggests that one of Marx's primary interests concerns philosophical issues. And in particular, Engels discusses Marx's attitude towards traditional questions of ontology and epistemology. Such a discussion inevitably requires, Engels points out, a 'short, coherent account' of the relationship which Marx's thought has 'to the Hegelian philosophy'. 43 In so far as the issue of ontology is concerned, Engels strongly emphasises the fact that Marx is a 'materialist', whereas Hegel is an 'idealist'. 44 Moreover, according to Engels, Marx's 'materialism' is a doctrine which does not refer exclusively to the social world, or to the realms of economics and history. It is a doctrine which also embraces the 'natural' world: an all-embracing philosophical world-view. According to Engels, however, Marx is a materialist of a rather special kind. In particular, he is not a 'mechanical' materialist with views similar to those of the 'Anglo-French' materialists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 45 The main difference between these types of materialism is that Anglo-French materialism did not see reality as undergoing any process of change or development, whereas, in Engels' opinion, Marx's 'materialism' is not 'static' but 'dynamic', and centres on Marx's acceptance of one 'great basic thought', inherited from the philosophy of Hegel, namely the idea that 'the world is not to be comprehended as a complex of ready made things, but as a complex of processes'. In short, unlike his predecessors, Marx possesses an appreciation of the importance of 'dialectics'. Central to Marx's philosophy is a commitment to the idea of a 'materialist dialectic'. To understand the world from the standpoint of this materialist 'dialectic' is to understand 'the general laws of motion', which, according to Engels, regulate both the 'external world' and that of 'human thought'. 46 The approach to the world adopted by this materialist 'dialectic' reveals the 'transitory character of everything' in that all things must inevitably undergo an 'uninterrupted process of becoming and passing away'.
Engels and Orthodox Marxism

47
Engels also strongly emphasises in this essay, in words which echo those employed by Marx himself in the second edition of Capital, that the relationship between Marx and Hegel is best understood by employing the metaphor of 'inversion'. The Hegelian philosophy, Engels insists, 'represents merely a materialism idealistically turned upside down'. Consequently, Marx's philosophy is, Engels maintains, one in which 'the dialectic of Hegel was placed upon its head', or rather, more accurately, 'turned off its head, on which it was standing, and placed upon its feet '. 48 Finally, Engels' essay on Feuerbach also contains a brief account of Marx's epistemological views, an account which, again, echoes that provided by Marx earlier, in the second edition of Capital. The key question here, Engels maintains, is the following: 'Are we able in our ideas and notions of the real world to produce a correct reflection of reality?' Interestingly, Engels insists that Marx and Hegel are at one in answering this question in the affirmative. Consequently, Engels attributes to both Marx and Hegel some sort of 'reflectionist' or 'copy' theory of knowledge. 49 The difference between Marx and Hegel, Engels says, somewhat obscurely, is that Marx comprehends 'the concepts in our heads once more materialistically -as images of real things'. He does not, therefore, like Hegel, regard 'real things' (in Engels' own sense of this term, of course -that is to say, material objects) as images of this or that stage of the absolute concept'. 50 In Engels' view, Marx's commitment to such a 'reflection theory' is in no way compromised by the fact that Marx's philosophy is based on a commitment to the principles of 'dialectics'. For 'dialectical philosophy' itself is 'nothing more than the mere reflection' of the dialectical processes of reality 'in the thinking brain'.
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It is Engels' account of Marx's attitude towards philosophical issues in his Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy which was to provide the philosophical underpinnings of 'Marxism' as it was later understood by the main theoreticians of the Second International. This account, which, even though Engels did not use it himself, is well captured by the expression 'dialectical materialism', was to become an integral element of what eventually came to be known as 'orthodox' Marxism. As Lucio Colletti has stated, Engels' works were to become the 'principal source' for all the 'philosophical problems of Marxism' around the turn of the nineteenth century.
52 For example, the interpretation of the Hegel-Marx connection expressed here by Engels was enthusiastically endorsed by Plekhanov, who was widely considered to be the 'philosopher' of the Second International. 53 Throughout the course of the twentieth century, however, and some would say even before, Engels' reputation as an authoritative source regarding Marx's thought, and especially for our understanding of Marx's relationship to Hegel, has frequently been brought into question. There have been many Marxists and students of Marxism who have argued that it is a mistake for us to assume unquestioningly that Marx and Engels thought as one with respect to all issues. According to these commentators, in his essay on Feuerbach, Engels misrepresents, misinterprets or misunderstands Marx's opinions regarding most of the issues discussed above. In particular, these critics have focused their attention on the doctrine of 'dialectical materialism', which is central to 'orthodox Marxism' in the period of the Second International. According to them, 'dialectical materialism', as Engels understands it in his own later writings, is a doctrine which is not only fundamentally incoherent and confused, but also quite alien to the approach to the world which, it is claimed, is adopted consistently by Marx throughout his intellectual life. It is to this re-evaluation of the Hegel-Marx connection that we now turn.
The Re-evaluation of the Hegel-Marx Connection
After Engels' death in 1895, the first stirrings of such a reassessment of the Conversely, however, it has also been suggested that Materialism and Empiriocriticism (1908), presented 'a philosophical position utterly at variance' with the 'Notebooks' on Hegel's Logic. 63 In the 'Notebooks', Lenin argued that the 'reflectionist theory of knowledge' is unable to copy objective reality completely, and idealism was not to be entirely dismissed. Lenin found in the 'most idealistic of Hegel's works' the 'least idealism and the most materialism'. 64 Consequently, he could declare that 'intelligent idealism is nearer to intelligent materialism than is stupid materialism'. 65 Out of the 'intelligent idealism' of Hegel, Lenin stressed the importance of grasping the concrete dialectically as a unity of opposites through subject and object, theory and practice.
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Hegel's idealism, was still idealism, but it contained within itself a materialist basis which Lenin sought to invert to make it properly materialist. Consequently, Lenin exhorted all Marxists to read Hegel's Logic if they were to understand Marx's Capital. It is, however, the publication of Georg Lukács' History and Class Consciousness in 1923 which is usually considered to represent the most significant step in the re-evaluation of the Hegel-Marx connection. Lukács was pivotal in moving away from the 'dialectical materialism' that seemed to have a stranglehold over Marxism after Engels. In this work, Lukács makes an explicit attack on Engels' lack of understanding of dialectics. Engels' failure is to ignore the dialectical interaction between subject and object in the historical process, and replace it with 'a onesided and rigid causality' that smacks of economic determinism. 67 Only
Hegel has attempted to overcome this dichotomy between subject and object. Lukács therefore returns to Hegel in order to unite dialectically these phenomena which have become separated. Hegel himself brings this union about idealistically through his notion of 'mind' or 'spirit', but for Lukács it is real human beings, as represented by the proletariat, who are the subject of history. 68 In his view, even though Hegel had done more than any previous philosopher to 'discover the meaning of concrete totality', and 'was constantly bent upon overcoming every kind of abstraction', identifying the proletariat as the 'real driving force [.] of history' was nevertheless the preserve of Marx. 69 For Lukács, Hegel 'remained imprisoned' in the 'duality of thought and being' and did not attempt to unite them concretely. 70 Marx's contribution was crucial, therefore, because he made such a union possible by emphasising the importance of uniting theory with practice, as explicated in his Theses on Feuerbach. Engels is further excoriated by Lukács for inheriting two particular errors from Hegel. The first is to emphasise the objective nature of the 'laws' of the capitalist system with little or no reference to the subject at its heart -the proletariat. It is only through the consciousness of the proletariat that theory can unite with practice and subject with object, which the 'positivist, mechanist and determinist views of Engels' failed to grasp. 71 The second error is to extend the use of the dialectic to nature, instead of limiting it to history and society. For Lukács, the 'crucial determinants of dialectics -the interaction between subject and object, the unity of theory and practice, the historical changes in the reality underlying the categories as the root cause of changes in thought, etc. -are absent from our knowledge of nature'. 72 Consequently, 'materialism'
for Marx is not a metaphysical system or an all-embracing philosophical world-view. Marx's 'materialism' is of a much more limited kind, because it is confined solely to the socio-historical sphere. Lukács' place in the history of our understanding of the Hegel-Marx connection is important, then, because he is usually considered, quite rightly, to be the first major thinker to challenge the 'orthodox' Marxism of Engels and the Second International. However, it must be acknowledged that Lukács' legacy in this regard is actually an ambivalent one, for although his interpretation of the thought of Marx is in some respects innovative and radical, his interpretation of the thought of Hegel in History and Class Consciousness is quite traditional. Lukács is certainly respectful of Hegel's contribution to Marxism and to the development of an emancipatory dialectical thought. However, he emphasises quite uncritically the importance of Marx's own, traditional reading of
